A Simplistic Solution

I didn’t have much time yesterday to look at the Inquiry hearings but saw enough to see confirmation of what most of us already knew – a shit system released into production purely down to political pressure and more importantly, incompetence on a grand scale.

It is always striking to observe not what is said but what is not said.   In the documents I saw revealed yesterday, no mention at all of the financial risks to the subpostmasters who were going to be forced to use the system when it was released.   No mention of rewriting the SPMR contracts to include recognition of their potential liability for using the system but plenty of mentions of the contract and liability that existed between POL and Fujitsu.  I am sure Sir Wyn will correctly identify that significant omission in his final report and I trust he will recognise and comment on the fact that to this day POL have made no effort to rewrite their contracts with SPMRs to include limitation of liability, warranty of software and a service level agreement just as POL have demanded from Fujitsu over the lifetime of Horizon.

The Inquiry is tasked to report on the many failings of POL, Fujitsu, Legal Teams and the Government that led to this scandal but it is also tasked to determine how to ensure such a scandal never happens again.   One way of looking at that is to put forward a reasonable suggestion as to what steps POL, Fujitsu and the Government should have taken when they first rolled out the system.

One of the key findings of Sir Wyn’s report will be the level of incompetence that existed among all parties involved at the time of the initial development of the system, from programmers to management.   It was stunningly high by all accounts (d = d * -1) and only a few people in the loop seemed to recognise this as a key failure at the time.  Incompetence though can exist at any time in any organisation and can be dealt with by introducing appropriate safeguards which can include transfer of risk.

It is agreed by all and sundry that no computer system is free from bugs yet new systems are rolled out all the time. It is the protection provided by the supplier of the software to the end user in whatever shape or form that allows these systems to be used without a guarantee of no defects.

As an example, the current rollout of driverless vehicles across the world by various manufacturers and by definition various software departments has only been possible because of the limitation of liability on the ‘operator’ of the vehicle by insurance companies and legislature.   Driverless car software bugs though still exist and are being exposed all the time – I saw a new one the other day as a Tesla car could not differentiate between a Truck and a Horse and Cart which could have consequences in any subsequent automated overtaking manoeuvre. The risk incurred of that happening and any associated financial penalty would not lie at the operator’s door.

Getting back to the Post Office Scandal though, what could POL have done to allow the rollout of dodgy software to the network back in 2000?

I have spoken to many people about this and the answer / solution seems very simplistic but I have yet to hear any arguments to suggest that it would not have solved the problem and that it would have prevented the scandal full stop.

First though let me remind you of the only ways a shortage in branch’s accounts could occur:

1. Software error of course (over and under)
2. Staff Theft
3. Over the Counter Errors
4. Value Stock Remittance Shortage/Overage
5. Remote Access
6. POL Administrative Errors / Fraud
7. Third Party Processing Errors
8. I have probably missed one or two ….

A few of these can also lead to overages as well which POL allow SPMRs to remove in cash in order to balance their accounts – that’s another story.

There may well have been 25,000 POL branches in 2000 with multiples of that in serving counters coupled with safes and secure storage areas but had each and every such location had a CCTV pointed at it with suitable recording facilities then items a) to d) could be eliminated as causes for discrepancies by the SPMR with CCTV proof.   That would have left POL to accept that the reason for the discrepancy being investigated lay in their hands and that they would have to accept responsibility for the loss.

If I were to suggest it is a measure of the now known and accepted incompetence of POL et al in 2000 that CCTV imagery was not mandated in each and every branch to cover any value stock movements and you were to agree then you should surely agree that that level of incompetence is only exaggerated by the fact that to this day, despite the Scandal, despite the GLO, despite the needless incarceration of so many innocent SPMRs, they still do not feel it necessary to make CCTV coverage mandatory in all branches.   Somebody – perhaps Sir Wyn, needs to look at the current incompetence levels in POL and the people in that organisation who continue to spend taxpayers money defending their own incompentence.

CCTV may be a simplistic solution but if anybody can show me a branch of a bank, a casino, a major supermarket , any place where significant amounts of cash are handled etc etc  that does not have CCTV I would be glad to hear of it.